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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1783 
 ___________ 
 
 CYRUS R. SANDERS, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
STEPHEN G. DOWNS, The Bradford County District Attorney.;  
ALBERT C. ONDREY, Assistant District Attorney; FRANCIS D.  
RINEER, Assistant District Attorney.; GREG HOSTETTLER,  
Bradford County Detective; CAPTAIN DONALD C. PETERS;  
TROOPER BERNOSKY; TROOPER PETROS; DAVID C.  
PELACHICK; GEORGE C. CONFER; UNKNOWN TROOPERS,  
Pennsylvania State Police; DANIEL J. BARRETT, District Attorney  
Bradford County; JEFFREY SMITH, Bradford County Judge;  
MARYLOU VANDERPOOL, Bradford County Court Administrator;  
JOHN KERN, JR.; LEONARD SIMPSON, District Attorney Sullivan  
County; CYNTHIA DUNLAP 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-01560) 
 District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 14, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: March 22, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
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  Cyrus Sanders, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed in the District Court a 
complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985.  Sanders appeals from the District Court’s 
order granting the defendant-appellees’ motion to dismiss.  For the reasons that follow, 
we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter for further proceedings. 
I. 
  Sanders’ complaint, filed in August 2008, alleged that his constitutional 
rights were violated by four different groups:  the Pennsylvania State Police and Bradford 
County police officers; Cynthia Dunlap, a private citizen; prosecutors in Bradford and 
Sullivan Counties; and officials of the Court of Common Pleas, Bradford County.  The 
complaint arose from two courses of conduct.   
  First, in January 2006, Sanders was arrested at his home on a fugitive 
warrant.  Sanders claimed that he refused the arresting officers’ request to search his 
property, but, notwithstanding his refusal, the officers conspired with Cynthia Dunlap to 
obtain such permission, even though she did not have authority to give such consent.
1
  
Sanders contended that, “[a]fter Petitioner was taken to the Bradford County P.S.P. 
Barracks, an extensive search was made at his home without a warrant or Petitioner’s 
consent.”  D. Ct. Doc. No. 1, 6 ¶ 35.  In his amended complaint, Sanders further alleged 
that “[m]embers of the P.S.P. deprived Petitioner, who was at the scene and readily 
                                                 
1
  Nothing in the record explains the nature of Sanders’ relationship to Ms. Dunlap.  
At a minimum, it appears that Dunlap was a guest on Sanders’ property, and he 
believes that officers agreed to overlook Dunlap’s possession of drug paraphernalia in 
exchange for her agreement to allow a search of Sanders’ property. 
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available, of the right to refuse consent to a warrantless search of his home . . . .”  D. Ct. 
Doc. No. 21, 17 ¶ 65.  As a result of the search, Sanders -- who had been incarcerated 
since the day of the search -- was charged with additional crimes and convicted.  Sanders 
argued that the conspiracy and unlawful search violated his constitutional rights. 
  Second, Sanders alleged that between June 2006 and March 2007, while he 
was incarcerated, certain individuals, including Dunlap, stole thousands of dollars in 
property from his home.  Sanders and his personal representative made several attempts 
to obtain assistance from the police, prosecutors, and the courts, but received no help.  
Sanders claimed that the various officials’ failures to act violated his constitutional rights 
to due process and equal protection. 
  The defendants filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).  The Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be 
dismissed, and the District Court granted the motions over Sanders’ objections.  Sanders 
appealed. 
II. 
  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we may affirm on 
any grounds supported by the record.  See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing 
Sanders’ complaint under Rule 12(b)(6).  See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey, 588 
F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing McGovern v. Philadelphia, 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d 
Cir. 2009)).  “We accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 
4 
 
reasonable inferences in [Sanders’] favor.”  McGovern, 554 F.3d at 115.  “The District 
Court’s judgment is proper only if, accepting all factual allegations as true and construing 
the complaint in the light most favorable to [Sanders], we determine that [he] is not 
entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.”  Id.  Although the 
District Court appropriately dismissed the bulk of Sanders’ claims, we conclude that the 
District Court erred in dismissing his unlawful search claim. 
  The District Court reasoned that Sanders’ unlawful search claim was barred 
by the statute of limitations.  In § 1983 cases, federal courts apply the state personal 
injury statute of limitations, which is two years in Pennsylvania.  See Smith v. Holtz, 87 
F.3d 108, 111 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524 (West 2004).  “A 
[§] 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the 
injury upon which [his] action is based.”  Sameric Corp. of Delaware v. Philadelphia, 142 
F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).  The District Court reasoned that, based on the averments 
in Sanders’ complaint, he was present for the search (in January 2006), but failed to file 
his complaint until August 2008 -- several months beyond the two-year limitations 
period.  The District Court expressly relied on a portion of Sanders’ amended complaint, 
which reads:  “Members of the P.S.P. deprived Petitioner, who was at the scene and 
readily available, of the right to refuse consent to a warrantless search of his home . . . .”  
D. Ct. Doc. No. 21, 17 ¶ 65.   
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  Sanders’ statement is somewhat vague, and we disagree with the District 
Court’s conclusion that the statement -- read in the light most favorable to Sanders -- 
indicates his presence during the search.  Construing his amended complaint liberally, 
one could reasonably conclude that Sanders did not admit to being present at the time of 
the search.  This approach is consistent with both the statement in his original complaint 
that the search occurred “[a]fter Petitioner was taken to the Bradford County P.S.P. 
Barracks,” D. Ct. Doc. No. 1-2, 6 ¶ 35, and his argument on appeal that he refused 
consent to search and was immediately taken to jail.  According to Sanders, the search 
did not occur until after he was taken to jail, and he did not learn of the search until 
around August 25, 2006, when he was unexpectedly transported from jail to be arraigned 
on charges stemming from the search.
 2
  If, as Sanders contends, he refused requests to 
search his property, was removed from the premises before any search occurred, and was 
not made aware of the search until, at the earliest, his August 2006 arraignment, then it 
appears his August 20, 2008, complaint was timely, albeit just barely.  Taking Sanders’ 
assertions as true, as is required under Rule 12(b)(6), we conclude that the District Court 
erred in dismissing his complaint as untimely. 
  We also disagree with the Magistrate Judge’s alternative conclusion -- 
which the District Court implicitly adopted -- that Sanders’ unlawful search claim was 
                                                 
2
  We take judicial notice that, according to the docket sheet related to Sanders’ 
proceedings before the Magisterial District Judge in Albany Township, Bradford 
County, Pennsylvania, Sanders was arrested and arraigned on August 23, 2006. 
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barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).  In Heck, the Supreme Court held 
that, “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 
conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 
sentence” no longer stands.  Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted).  However, Heck does not 
typically bar actions for Fourth Amendment violations, such as those Sanders alleges.
 3
  
See id. at 487 n.7. 
  As to Sanders’ § 1985 conspiracy claim, the District Court correctly 
reasoned that Sanders failed to state a cognizable claim because he did not allege in his 
complaint or amended complaint that any racial or otherwise class-based discriminatory 
animus lay behind the defendants’ actions.  See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health 
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993). 
  The District Court also properly dismissed Sanders’ claims that officials 
violated his right to due process by failing to properly respond to the reports of alleged 
thefts from his home.  As to Sanders’ claim against the Pennsylvania State Police and the 
Bradford County police officers, the District Court correctly reasoned that there is no 
constitutional right to the investigation or prosecution of another.  See Mitchell v. 
                                                 
3
  We also note that Dunlap’s status as a private citizen does not shield her from 
liability.  “[A] private party can be liable under § 1983 if he or she willfully 
participates in a joint conspiracy with state officials to deprive a person of a 
constitutional right . . . .”  Max v. Republican Comm. of Lancaster Cnty., 587 F.3d 
198, 203 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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McNeil, 487 F.3d 374, 378 (6
th
 Cir. 2007) (citing Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 
619 (1973) (observing that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the 
prosecution or nonprosecution of another”)).  Sanders’ claims against prosecutors in 
Bradford and Sullivan Counties necessarily fail because prosecutors enjoy absolute 
immunity for the failure to adequately investigate a case and for the decision to initiate, 
or decline to initiate, a prosecution.  See Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1463-64 
(3d Cir. 1992).   
  Relatedly, Sanders asserted throughout his amended complaint that the 
police and prosecutors’ failure to respond to his complaints violated his right to equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The District Court reasoned that Sanders’ 
equal protection argument failed for the same reason as his due process argument:  there 
is no constitutional right to a criminal investigation or a prosecution.  However, an equal 
protection analysis concerns whether government actors discriminated against an 
individual for an impermissible reason, such as race, religion, or some other unjustifiable 
classification.  See Price v. Cohen, 715 F.2d 87, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1983).  An appropriate 
reason for dismissing Sanders’ equal protection claim, then, is that he failed to allege that 
he was discriminated against on an impermissible basis.  To the extent that Sanders 
alleged that he was discriminated against based on his status as a felon, he did not allege 
that felons, as a class, receive disparate treatment; nor did he allege that non-felons 
receive more help. 
  As to Sanders’ claim against Judge Smith of the Court of Common Pleas, 
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Bradford County, the District Court reasoned that Judge Smith was entitled to absolute 
judicial immunity for his decision denying Sanders’ petition for review of the District 
Attorney’s decision not to initiate a prosecution based on the thefts from Sanders’ home.  
We agree.  See Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). 
  Finally, Sanders’ complaint included a claim against Marylou Vanderpool, 
Bradford County Court Administrator, for failing to file his court documents.  The 
Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require that documents be filed in the Clerk’s 
Office, and that they also be served upon the court administrator.  See Pa. R. Crim. P. 
576.  The District Court correctly reasoned that, although Vanderpool apparently had 
assisted Sanders in complying with Rule 576 in the past, she was under no duty to do so 
in all instances and did not violate his right to due process by requiring him to file his 
documents with the Clerk’s Office.  We agree.  See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 
U.S. 422, 437 (1982) (“The State may erect reasonable procedural requirements for 
triggering the right to an adjudication . . . [a]nd the state certainly accords due process 
when it terminates a claim for failure to comply with a reasonable procedural . . . rule.” 
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)). 
  Accordingly, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter 
for further proceedings. 
 
 
 
